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et al.: Right to Be Present

RIGHT TO BE PRESENT
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6:
In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be
allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in
civil actions and shall be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation and be confronted with the witnesses against him.
U.S. CoNST. amend. VI:
In all criminalprosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the rights
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartialjury of the State and
...

to be confronted with the witnesses against him ....

COURT OF APPEALS
8 16
People v. Velasco
(decided April 4, 1991)

A criminal defendant claimed that his right to be present under
the state 8 17 and federal 818 constitutions was violated because he
was not present at all material stages of his criminal proceeding.
The defendant was absent from a precharge conference, a sidebar voir dire, and a conference in the robing room where counsel
advised the court of their peremptory challenges and their challenges for cause. 819
The court of appeals held that the defendant was not constitutionally required to be present at the precharge conference, attended by counsel for both sides, as it involved only questions of
law or procedure. 820 The court also held that the defendant was
not constitutionally required to be present at the side-bar voir dire
816. 77 N.Y.2d 469, 570 N.E.2d 1070, 568 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1991).
817. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
818. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

819. Velasco, 77 N.Y.2d at 472, 510 N.E.2d at 1071, 568 N.Y.S.2d at
722.
820. Id.
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because "the determination that a prospective juror was
disqualified before voir dire was a matter for the court and [the]
defendant had no... constitutional right to personally participate
in the discussions leading to the court's ruling."' 82 1 Lastly, the
court held that the defendant's constitutional right to be present at
the impaneling of the jury was not violated by his exclusion from
the robing room conference because "[t]he in-chambers discussion was a mere preliminary advisement of the court of challenges later effectuated in open court in the presence of [the] defendant and thus did not constitute a material part of the
trial. ,,822

The defendant, Velasco, was convicted of first degree
manslaughter resulting from an altercation in which he fatally
stabbed Raymond Nelson with a "Ninja" knife. 823 At the
precharge conference, which was conducted in the court's robing
room without the defendant present, 824 the parties discussed a
stipulation regarding medical records, scheduling of the remainder of the trial and the court's charge to the jury. Additionally,
the court denied a motion to dismiss the murder charge but
granted a motion to dismiss a weapons charge. 825
The trial court, prior to the formal voir dire, asked the
prospective jurors a series of questions, in the presence of the
defendant, "designed to search out matters which might lead to
disqualification .
"...,826
Jurors wishing to respond were
directed to approach the bench where further inquiry was
conducted between the court and juror in the presence of counsel
821. Id. at 473, 570 N.E.2d at 1071, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
822. Id. at 473, 570 N.E.2d at 1072, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 723; see also People
v. Dokes, 570 N.Y.S.2d 357 (2d Dep't 1991), appeal granted, 78 N.Y.2d
1075, 583 N.E.2d 950, 577 N.Y.S.2d 238 (1991); cf.People v. Ramos, 173
A.D.2d 748, 570 N.Y.S.2d 247 (2d Dep't) (requiring that a defendant have a

meaningful opportunity to participate in the critical stage of determining the
ultimate composition of the jury), appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d 1080, 583
N.E.2d 955, 577 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1991).
823. Velasco, 77 N.Y.2d at 471-72, 570 N.E.2d at 1071, 568 N.Y.S.2d
722.
824. Id. at 472, 570 N.E.2d at 1071, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
825. Id.

826. Id. at 472-73, 570 N.E.2d at 1071, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
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for both sides. However, the defendant and the remaining venire
were excluded from these discussions. As a result of these
conferences, some prospective jurors were excused while others
were returned to the jury box for voir dire.827
During the impaneling of the jury, a conference was held in the
robing room where counsel advised the court of their peremptory
challenges and advanced the legal basis for their challenges for
cause. Although the defendant was not present during the
conference in the robing room, he had an opportunity to consult
with his attorney before the challenges were made.828
Additionally, the voir dire itself was held in open court as were
formal challenges.
The court stated that while the defendant had a right to be
present during the court's charge to the jury, the summations of
counsel, and the impaneling of the jury, "[h]is presence is
required only where his absence would have a substantial effect
on his ability to defend." 829 The court further noted that due
process only requires the defendant's presence at his trial "'to the
extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his
absence, and to that extent only."' 830
With regard to the precharge conference held in the court's
robing room, the court noted that "[t]he conference involved
only questions of law or procedure and defendant's presence was
not required." ' 831 The court downplayed the defendant's absence
from the side-bar voir dire because "[hie was present during the
intitial questioning of the jurors and represented by counsel dur827. Id. at 473, 570 N.E.2d at 1071, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
828. Id. at 473, 570 N.E.2d at 1072, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 723.

829. Id. at 472, 570 N.E.2d at 1071, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722; see also People
v. Mullen, 44 N.Y.2d 1, 4-5, 374 N.E.2d 369, 370, 403 N.Y.S.2d 470, 472

(1978) (court delineated the scope of a criminal defendant's constitutional right
to be present during the trial of an indictment to include attendance at the jury
impaneling, the introduction of evidence, counsels' summations, the jury
charge and during additional instructions to the jury in the course of

deliberation).
830. Velasco, 77 N.Y.2d at 472, 570 N.E.2d at 1071, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722

(quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 108 (1934)).
831. Id.
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ing the discussions at the bench. ' 832 Therefore, the court concluded that the "defendant's presence at the bench conference
would have been 'useless, or the benefit but a shadow.' 833
Lastly, the court again relied on the fact that the defendant had
counsel available to protect his rights while absent from a conference in the robing room wherein "counsel advised the court of
their peremptory challenges and challenges for cause." ' 834
Federal law in this area is governed by Snyder v.
Massachusetts.835 The Snyder decision stands for the propostion
that due process requires the presence of the defendant if "[i]t
bears, or may fairly be assumed to bear, a relation, reasonably
substantial, to his opportunity to defend.", 836 However, the
Court's assumption that a defendant has the right "to be present
in his own person"' 837 is not guaranteed in instances where the
privilege would be illusory." 83 8 Furthermore, the Court noted
that a state is "free to regulate the procedure of its courts in
accordance with its own conception of policy and fairness unless
in so doing offends some principle of justice .... "839 The
Court further acknowledged that while the "defense may be made
easier if the accused is permitted to be present at the examination
of the jurors or the summing up of counsel[,] ' ' 840 it leaves the
door open for the court to use its discretion. 84 1 Thus, the
defendant is only "guaranteed the right to be present at any stage
of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his
832. Id. at 473, 570 N.E.2d at 1071, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
833. Id.at 473, 570 N.E.2d at 1071-72, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722-23 (quoting
Snyder, 291 U.S. at 106-07).
834. Id. at 473, 570 N.E.2d at 1072, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 723.
835. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
836. Id. at 106.
837. Id. at 105.

838. Id. at 106-07.
839. Id. at 105.
840. Id. at 106

841. The Snyder Court noted that "[m]any motions before trial are heard in
the defendant's absence." Id. at 107. Furthermore, the Court noted that

confusion will result if the Court fails to "mark the distinction between
requirements in respect of presence that have their source in the common law,
and requirements that have their source... in the federal constitution." Id.
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presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure. ,,842
The New York courts have regularly followed Snyder when
determining whether the defendant's right to be present has been
violated. In People v. Rodriguez, 84 3 the court held that a discussion between the trial judge and defendant's counsel regarding the
charge to the jury, which took place outside the jury's presence,
did not violate his right to be present because the discussion "did
not effect (sic) his ability to defend himself against the charges in
845
any way .... "844 Similarly, in People ex rel. Lupo v. Fay,
the court argued that the defendant's right to be present
throughout trial "must be kept within limits of common sense
and reason." 846 The court held that the defendant's presence was
not required when his counsel argued a motion for mistrial because "[i]t is not literally true that after indictment nothing may
validly be done in the defendant's absence ....There is no such
requirement in decisions or by custom or tradition. "847
Thus, under both the state and federal constitutions a criminal
defendant's right to be present at all stages of his trial is not fully
guaranteed, but is dependent upon whether or not the stage is
material to the trial and whether his presence is needed in his
defense.
842. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987); see also United States
v. Gordon, 829 F.2d 119, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
843. 76 N.Y.2d 918, 564 N.E.2d 658, 563 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1990).
844. Id. at 921, 564 N.E.2d at 659, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 49; see also Dokes,

570 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
845. 13 N.Y.2d 253, 196 N.E.2d 56, 246 N.Y.S.2d 399 (1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 958 (1964).
846. Id. at 256, 196 N.E.2d at 58, 246 N.Y.S.2d at 401.

847. Id.; see also People v. Mullen, 44 N.Y.2d 1, 5, 374 N.E.2d 369,
371, 403 N.Y.S.2d 470, 472 (1978) (literal application of mandate requiring

presence of a criminal defendant at trial is not demanded); People v. Ferguson,
67 N.Y.2d 383, 390, 494 N.E.2d 77, 81, 502 N.Y.S.2d 972, 976 (1986)
("[A] defendant who has a lawyer relegates control of much of the case to the
lawyer except as to certain fundamental decisions reserved to the client.");
Ramos, 173 A.D.2d at 749, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 248 (2d Dep't 1991)
(defendant's right to be present does not extend to every discussion between
counsel and court, and particularly not to discussions relating to jury
empanelment or the exercise of challenges).
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